# Mo State v Oklahoma – round 4 AFF

## 2AC

### non-falsifiability DA

#### Methodologically, we can still test claims without expecting to create a capital “T” truth - an orientation towards discussing effects based on implementation of a plan encourages a thorough epistemology without restricting creativity and freedom.

Kenneth Cauthen, 1997, the John Price Crozer Griffith emeritus Professor of Theology at Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School, “Relativism and Ethics: What is Truth - does it matter?” http://www.bigissueground.com/philosophy/cauthen-relativism2.shtml

I have written on subjects in theology, ethics, and philosophy and developed an outlook at least in minimalist terms that is to me convincing.[5] My intention is to describe reality as it is, to lay out propositions that correspond with the objectively existing state of affairs. Yet such is the depth of my acknowledgment of relativism and my skepticism that I do not find it useful to ask whether statements about God, the meaning of life, and the moral obligations of human beings are literally true or even approximately represent things as they really are. Non-relativists who hold certain positions with great confidence have no alternative but to say that those who disagree with them are wrong. I am not prepared to say that those who disagree with me on moral, metaphysical, and religious matters are wrong. I just say I see it differently and will act on my own convictions in appropriate ways, and that includes opposing those who differ with means proportionate to the seriousness of the issue. I also assume that every other religious, moral, and metaphysical claim is no less relative in principle than mine. Relativism, however, does not preclude passion, commitment, and action in line with one's own relative viewpoint. It ideally produces humility accompanied by acts of love in the quest for justice and an openness to deeper insight. Moreover, all claims about morality and religion can be tested by myself and others but without certain or absolutely conclusive results. The first criterion is theoretical. I can employ the rational test of coherence (internal consistency with all other propositions I affirm) and the empirical test of evidence (adequacy in accounting for the full range of experience). Yet I know that however successful I may be in applying these tests of truth, the outcome is such that only one who stands where I stand will see what I see. All I can say is that this is the best I have been able to come up with so far. Methods of justifying claims are internal to the point of view being tested and part of it, so that no method provides a way of escaping the relativity that marks all belief systems. The second and most important test is practical. Is the outlook useful in interpreting the whole range of my experience in an adequate (rationally plausible) way and in providing guidance in coping with life? When I live by what I find convincing as a rational being, are the results satisfactory and satisfying judged by the best standards available to me up to now as I continue to learn and revise both my theory and my practices? One hopes that learning, maturity, and experience will lead to increasingly adequate and fulfilling ways of believing and living, loving and hoping, thinking and acting. In the end I am a pragmatist who in the presence of the ultimate questions abandons the hope of knowing with certainty what the ultimate answers are. Nevertheless, I find in my own outlook a way of thinking and living more useful and productive than any alternatives available to me at this time. Are my religious and moral convictions literally true? Do they correspond with reality? These questions are interesting but futile. It would be the greatest miracle of all time if out of all the religions and philosophies every produced on this earth, it turned out that my own was the closest of any to getting it right, telling it like it is, picturing objective reality so that the picture and pictured are remarkably alike! I have a better chance of winning the grand lottery at chances of a 100, 000, 000 to 1. Yet I must live some way, believe something, hope for what seems most likely, and die trusting it was not all in vain. I proceed, then, as a relativist, a pragmatist, and a skeptic who employs correspondence theory as far as it will take me, but beyond the ordinary facts of mundane life, that is not very far, especially when one enters the realms of morality and religion.

#### Without this epistemology you should reject all ‘truth claims’ - questions cannot be answered without crafting them in a way where they can be answered, challenged or analyzed - in this sense, their epistemology is deeply flawed.

Stanley Fish, 6-21-2002, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, writes a monthly column for the Career Network on campus politics and academic careers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Say It Ain't So,” google

First the belief, devoutly held and endlessly rehearsed, that the purpose of writing is self-expression. The convenience of this belief, for those who profess it, is that they need never accept correction; for if it is their precious little selves they are expressing, the language of expression is answerable only to the internal judgment of those same selves, and any challenge from the outside can be met simply by saying, (as students often do) "I know what I mean," or, more precisely, "I know what I mean." Students who say and believe this will never confront an important truth: Language has its own structure (not unchanging, to be sure, but fixed enough at any one moment to serve as both a constraint and a resource). If you do not submit yourself to the conventional meanings of words and to the grammatical forms that specify the relationships between the objects words refer to, the prose you produce will say something -- language, not you or I, means -- but it will not say what you wanted to say. That's only because your readers will not be inside your head where they might ask the self-seeking expression what it had in mind, but will instead be on the outside processing the formal patterns of your written language and reaching the conclusions dictated and generated by those patterns. In fact, however, what I've just said is a bit misleading because it suggests that fully formed thoughts exist in some inner mental space and manage to make it into the outside world when they are clothed in the proper syntactical and lexical forms. But as everyone used to know before the cult of self-expression triumphed, the ability even to have certain kinds of thoughts depends on the prior ability to produce (and comprehend) certain kinds of sentences. People don't think naturally in the future perfect or in parallel constructions or in the subjunctive mood; rather these grammatical alternatives are learned, and learned with them are the ways of thinking they make possible -- relating to one another on a time-line events or states of being that have not yet happened; lining up persons, objects, and actions in relationships of similarity and opposition; reasoning from contrary-to-fact assertions to assertions about what was or could be done in the past, present, or future. These are complex mental actions, and students will be able to perform them only if their minds are stocked with the right grammatical furniture, with forms that have no specific content but make possible the organization of any content into temporal/spatial arrangements that suggest and make available modes of action in the world. The organization of the world in ways that expand the possibilities of thought and action -- that, not self-expression, is the purpose of writing, and it is preeminently a social purpose. That is, it is a purpose not pursued alone but in conjunction with others to whom one writes (in speeches, essays, letters, memos, directives, proclamations, editorials, books) with the intention of imparting information, or clarifying issues, or establishing truths or bringing about changes or rousing armies or quieting conflicts, or any of the other ends one might work for in the public arena. Writing then is, by and large, an act either of communication or persuasion, and to engage in it successfully, you have to do more than have something to say; you must be prepared to back it up, supply evidence, respond to objections, expose contradictions, parse the arguments of the opposition and so on. You must conceive yourself not as a lone voice singing in the shower, but as a participant in the multiple dialogues that are the vehicles of discursive and political life. But you will not be able to participate effectively if you are content merely to have expressed your opinion. And this brings me to the second reason so many of our students are incapable of writing intelligible sentences or of linking one bad sentence to another in something that approximates an argument. They have been allowed to believe that their opinions -- formed by nothing, supported by even less -- are interesting. The belief that what you're supposed to do is express yourself goes hand in hand with the belief that whatever you happen to express is valuable and if you believe both these things you will not believe that there is any reason to worry about subject-verb agreement or pronouns without nouns or missing transitions or anything else. In response to any question you just say the first thing that comes into your head, and in response to any challenge you just say, "That's my opinion" or "That's what I think," or "My view is as good as yours." No sentiments are more subversive of the possibility of productive classroom activity, and the instructor who hears them coming from the mouths of his or her students should immediately tell them, "Check your opinions, your ideas, your views at the door; they are not fungible currency here." This announcement, which will, at the very least, deliver a salutary shock ("I can't believe she said that"), might possibly open up a space in which writing is taken seriously because it will have identified (by an act of elimination) the true nature of academic work, which is not the work of caressing the self and its effusions, but the work of applying the techniques of reflection, analysis, and critique to matters of general (not personal) concern. But of course no action taken by a single instructor is likely to change very much in the absence of structural changes in the way writing and argument are taught. And here is where the administration comes in. Every dean should forthwith insist that all composition courses teach grammar and rhetoric and nothing else. No composition course should have a theme, especially not one the instructor is interested in. Ideas should be introduced not for their own sake, but for the sake of the syntactical and rhetorical points they help illustrate, and once they serve this purpose, they should be sent away. Content should be avoided like the plague it is, except for the deep and inexhaustible content that will reveal itself once the dynamics of language are regarded not as secondary, mechanical aids to thought, but as thought itself. Of course everyone will resist you, from the students who believe that grammar is a form of tyranny presided over by the academic version of the police, to the instructors who will believe the same and wish not to be policemen, to the experts in composition who will believe that you are incredibly reactionary and desire only to turn back the clock. But persevere, for you will be in the right. And teach such a course yourself, which is what I am going to do next fall. I'll save a place for Larry S. particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

### Style

#### Rapid-fire simplification promotes effective communication and understanding within political debates.

\*Even though khalilzad gets spewed in 15 seconds in every debate ever, that’s good because it allows for an in-road into discussions of u.s. leadership and war, both of which are important

Holly Doremus, Winter 2000, Prof. of law @ UC Davis, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11

 A. Telling Political Stories It is not difficult to understand why the complex strands of each of the three discourses of nature have been reduced in the political context to a handful of shorthand stories. In the political arena, the most nuanced discourse tends to be simplified in this way. Political argument is better suited to soundbite-sized stories, brief accounts that evoke striking images intended to communicate larger points, than to multifaceted discussion. [\*42] It is easy to condemn the tendency of political debate to simplify arguments. Political rhetoric certainly can camouflage complexity, encourage people to overlook important principles, and distort issues. n191 Sound-bites can substitute for, or even obscure, principled analysis. But these brief stories can also serve a valuable, and valid, political function. Stories, particularly familiar ones, are well suited to quick, effective communication. Every teacher knows the power of a good rhetorical image to communicate a subtle concept. Stories also can invoke intuitions that may otherwise be overlooked because they are not readily accessible through reason alone. n192 Furthermore, the emotional power of stories can spur listeners to action in ways that abstract rational argument, no matter how logically compelling, typically does not. n193

#### Critical thinking – breakneck delivery teaches students to think fast in a way no other activity does.

Patrick Speice & Jim Lyle, 2003, Oceans Policy Adrift , “traditional policy debate: now more than ever,” <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Second, policy debate teaches debaters how to make these decisions quickly (Coverstone, 1995). In the midst of a debate there is not time to sit back and contemplate what decision to make, if, at the very most, a debater has only eight to ten minutes (if they wish to utilize all of their preparation time) to make a decision and stick with it. This need for decision is magnified as the debates occur at faster speeds of presentation. Debaters have to be focused on the arguments being offered, have to be able to understand them very quickly, and they have to be able to discern which arguments are of the greatest significance for the round. The decisions that are made might not be the best, but debaters are able to make a decision in seconds and then present the reasons for that decision. This occurs in the constructives, rebuttals, and cross-examinations. This ability to make a choice instantaneously is probably the most significant of skills that the policy debate model offers.

#### Debate jargon is good – provides a role in understanding society's problem.

Star A. Muir, 1993, Dept. of Communications @ George Mason, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4. Gale Academic Onefile

Even the specialized jargon required to play the game successfully has benefits in terms of analyzing and understanding society's problems. Consider the terminology of the "disadvantage" against the affirmative's plan: There is a "link" between the plan and some effect, or "impact"; the link can be actions that push us over some "threshold" to an impact, or it can be a "linear" relationship where each increase causes an increase in the impact; the link from the affirmative plan to the impact must be "unique," in that the plan itself is largely responsible for the impact; the affirmative may argue a "turnaround" to the disadvantage, claiming it as an advantage for the plan. Such specialized jargon may separate debate talk from other types of discourse, but the ideas represented here are also significant and useful for analyzing the relative desirability of public policies. There really are threshold and brink issues in evaluating public policies. Though listening to debaters talk is somewhat disconcerting for a lay person, familiarity with these concepts is an essential means of connecting the research they do with the evaluation of options confronting citizens and decision makers in political and social contexts. This familiarity is directly related to the motivation and the ability to get involved in issues and controversies of public importance.

### alternative answers

#### Making the personal political fails.

Patricia Collins, 1997, professor of sociology at the University of Cinncinnati, 1997, Fighting Words, p. 135-6

In this sense, postmodern views of power that overemphasize hegemony and local politics provide a seductive mix of appearing to challenge oppression while secretly believing that such efforts are doomed. Hegemonic power appears as ever expanding and invading. It may even attempt to “annex” the counterdiscourses that have developed, oppositional discourses such as Afrocentrism, postmodernism, feminism, and Black feminist thought. This is a very important insight. However, there is a difference between being aware of the power of one’s enemy and arguing that such power is so pervasive that resistance will, at best, provide a brief respite and, at worst, prove ultimately futile. This emphasis on power as being hegemonic and seemingly absolute, coupled with a belief in local resistance as the best that people can do, flies in the face of actual, historical successes. African-Americans, women, poor people, and others have achieved results through social movements, revolts, revolutions, and other collective social action against government, corporate, and academic structures. As James Scott queries, “What remains to be explained…is why theories of hegemony…have…retained an enourmous intellectual appeal to social scientists and historians” (1990, 86). Perhaps for colonizers who refuse, individualized, local resistance is the best that they can envision. Overemphasizing hegemony and stressing nihilism not only does not resist injustice but participates in its manufacture. Views of power grounded exclusively in notions of hegemony and nihilism are not only pessimistic, they can be dangerous for members of historically marginalized groups. Moreover, the emphasis on local versus structural institutions makes it difficult to examine major structures such as racism, sexism, and other structural forms of oppression. Social theories that reduce heirarchical power relations to the level of representation, performance, or constructed phenomena not only emphasize the likelihood that resistance will fail in the face of a pervasive hegemonic presence, they also reinforce perceptions that local, individualized micropolitics constitutes the most effective terrain of struggle. This emphasis on the local dovetails nicely with increasing emphasis on the “personal” as a source of power and with parallel attention to subjectivity. If politics becomes reduced to the “personal,” decentering relations of ruling in academia and other bureaucratic structures seems increasingly unlikely. As Rey Chow opines, “What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand” (1993, 13).

#### Racialized descriptions of society reinscribe same racial binaries- constitutes the subject around race.

John Hartigan, Summer 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”

These racial identities define the type of subjects that Visweswaran advocates bringing into view via ‘‘a conception of race which is socially dynamic but historically meaningful,’’ even though their objectification potentially risks contributing, unintentionally, to the current resurgence in sociobiological notions of race. Visweswaran’s approach brings race to the fore of critical analysis, but the problem is that it also risks reproducing racial thinking in much the way ‘‘culture’’ has been accused of perpetuating race. Herbert Lewis highlights the perils in efforts to articulate this broader sensibility concerning race.8 Where Visweswaran strives to reanimate the ‘‘richly connotative 19th century sense of ‘race,’ ’’ with its invocations of ‘‘blood’’ as a form of collectivity that encompasses ‘‘numerous elements that we would today call cultural,’’ Lewis cautions against a ‘‘return to the pre-Boasian conception that combines race, culture, language, nationality and nationality in one neat package’’ (980). And though the equation of racial identity with the forms of persecution and exploitation highlighted by Visweswaran is insightful, Lewis observes that, pursued further, this logic reactivates a concept that ‘‘indissolubly connects groups of people and their appearance with beliefs about their capacity and behavior’’ (ibid.).Given the criteria she lists, Lewis argues, ‘‘it follows presumably that we should recognize as ‘races’ all those who have suffered one or another form of ill-treatment. Certainly Jews would now return to the status of a ‘racial’ group (as the Nazis contended), as do Armenians, Gypsies (Rom), ‘Untouchables’ (Dalits) in India, East Timorese, Muslim and Croats in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia, educated Cambodians in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi’’ (ibid.). Every similarly subjected group would be reinscribed and reidentified with the very terms used initially to distinguish them for exploitation and persecution. Dominguez’s concerns about culture’s propensity for ‘‘perpetuating the very terms—of hierarchies of differential values—that constitute the hegemony’’ seem equally relevant to this attempt to ensconce race at the forefront of critical social analysis. There follow interminable questions of subdividing and distinguishing such races. Visweswaran’s description of the processes that produce ‘‘Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races’’ leads Lewis to ask, ‘‘Are these two different ‘races’ or one? Can rich, powerful, and selfassured Puerto Ricans belong to this ‘race’? Do Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Cubans each get to be their own race, or can they all be in one race with Chicanos and Puerto Ricans because they all speak (or once spoke) Spanish? Can Spanish-speakers from Spain belong, too?’’ (980). The problem with formulating research in terms of race is that it becomes very difficult to proceed without reproducing various racialized logics that promote the notion that groups are essentially differentiated—experientially and in terms of innate capacities and dispositions—by race.9 This is a problem that Gilroy takes as a basis for his critique of ‘‘raciology,’’ which I will examine further below.

#### Totalizing critiques of whiteness commodify races- essentialisms ensure no alt solvency.

John Hartigan, Summer 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”

One might be tempted to assume that Gilroy’s stance is largely polemical, but his critique is thoroughgoing, as is his call to reject ‘‘this desire to cling on to ‘race’ and go on stubbornly and unimaginatively seeing the world on the distinctive scales that it has specified.’’ In spite of powerful, novel efforts to fundamentally transform racial analysis—such as the emergence of ‘‘whiteness studies’’ or analyses of the ‘‘new racism’’—Gilroy is emphatic in ‘‘demand[ing] liberation not from white supremacy alone, however urgently that is required, but from all racializing and raciological thought, fromracialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking’’ (40). In contrast to Visweswaran—and, interestingly, voicing concerns over ‘‘cultural politics’’ that resonate with Dominguez’s critique—Gilroy sees a host of problems in ‘‘black political cultures’’ that rely on ‘‘essentialist approaches to building solidarity’’ (38).14 Nor does he share Harrison’s confidence in making racism the centerpiece of critical cultural analysis. Gilroy plainly asserts that ‘‘the starting point of this book is that the era of New Racism is emphatically over’’ (34). A singular focus on racism precludes an attention to ‘‘the appearance of sharp intraracial conflicts’’ and does not effectively address the ‘‘several new forms of determinism abroad’’ (38, 34). We still must be prepared ‘‘to give effective answers to the pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their confluence’’ (41). But the diffuse threats posed by invocations of racially essentialized identities (shimmering in ‘‘the glamour of sameness’’) as the basis for articulating ‘‘black political cultures’’ entails an analytical approach that countervails against positing racism as the singular focus of inquiry and critique.15 From Gilroy’s stance, to articulate a ‘‘postracial humanism’’ we must disable any form of racial vision and ensure that it can never again be reinvested with explanatory power. But what will take its place as a basis for talking about the dynamics of belonging and differentiation that profoundly shape social collectives today? Gilroy tries to make clear that it will not be ‘‘culture,’’ yet this concept infuses his efforts to articulate an alternative conceptual approach. Gilroy conveys many of the same reservations about culture articulated by the anthropologists listed above. Specifically, Gilroy cautions that ‘‘the culturalist approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable consequences of illegitimate attempts to mix and amalgamate primordially incompatible groups’’ (27). In contrast, Gilroy expressly prefers the concept of diaspora as a means to ground a new form of attention to collective identities. ‘‘As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race,’ nation, and bounded culture coded into the body,’’ Gilroy finds that ‘‘diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and historical mechanics of belonging’’ (123). Furthermore, ‘‘by focusing attention equally on the sameness within differentiation and the differentiation within sameness, diaspora disturbs the suggestion that political and cultural identity might be understood via the analogy of indistinguishable peas lodged in the protective pods of closed kinship and subspecies’’ (125). And yet, in a manner similar to Harrison’s prioritizing of racism as a central concern for social inquiry, when it comes to specifying what diaspora entails and how it works, vestiges of culture reemerge as a basis for the coherence of this new conceptual focus. When Gilroy delineates the elements and dimensions of diaspora, culture provides the basic conceptual background and terminology. In characterizing ‘‘the Atlantic diaspora and its successor-cultures,’’ Gilroy sequentially invokes ‘‘black cultural styles’’ and ‘‘postslave cultures’’ that have ‘‘supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular cultures, and styles of dissent far from their place of origin’’ (178). Gilroy explains how the ‘‘cultural expressions’’ of hip-hop and rap, along with other expressive forms of ‘‘black popular culture,’’ are marketed by the ‘‘cultural industries’’ to white consumers who ‘‘currently support this black culture’’ (181). Granted, in these uses of ‘‘culture’’ Gilroy remains critical of ‘‘absolutist definitions of culture’’ and the process of commodification that culture in turn supports. But his move away from race importantly hinges upon some notion of culture. We may be able to do away with race, but seemingly not with culture.

### policy focus good

#### Deliberative policymaking through debate over nuclear power is the crucial to solving the environment - reflecting as a critical intellectual is not enough.

Marian Herbick & Jon Isham, October 2010, Marian Herbick is a senior at the University of Vermont, where she is studying natural resource planning and wildlife biology, member of the Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources and the Honors College, Jon Isham, department of economics and the program in environmental studies at Middlebury College. teaches in environmental economics, environmental policy, introductory microeconomics, social capital in Vermont, and global climate change, “The Promise of Deliberative Democracy,” <http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/775>

Getting to 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere will require massive investments in clean-energy infrastructure—investments that can too often be foiled by a combination of special interests and political sclerosis. Take the recent approval of the Cape Wind project by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In some ways, this was great news for clean-energy advocates: the project’s 130 turbines will produce, on average, 170 megawatts of electricity, almost 75 percent of the average electricity demand for Cape Cod and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.1 But, because of local opposition by well-organized opponents, the approval process was lengthy, costly, and grueling —and all for a project that will produce only 0.04 percent of the total (forecasted) U.S. electricity demand in 2010.2,3 Over the next few decades, the world will need thousands of large-scale, low-carbon electricity projects—wind, solar, and nuclear power will certainly be in the mix. But if each faces Cape Wind–like opposition, getting to 350 is unlikely. How can the decision-making process about such projects be streamlined so that public policy reflects the view of a well-informed majority, provides opportunities for legitimate critiques, but does not permit the opposition to retard the process indefinitely? One answer is found in a set of innovative policy-making tools founded on the principle of deliberative democracy, defined as “decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens.”4 Such approaches, which have been developed and led by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (cdd.stanford.edu), America Speaks ([www.americaspeaks.org](http://www.americaspeaks.org/)), and the Consensus Building Institute (cbuilding.org), among others, are gaining popularity by promising a new foothold for effective citizen participation in the drive for a clean-energy future. Deliberative democracy stems from the belief that democratic leadership should involve educating constituents about issues at hand, and that citizens may significantly alter their opinions when faced with information about these issues. Advocates of the approach state that democracy should shift away from fixed notions toward a learning process in which people develop defensible positions.5 While the approaches of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, America Speaks, and the Consensus Building Institute do differ, all of these deliberative methodologies involve unbiased sharing of information and public-policy alternatives with a representative set of citizens; a moderated process of deliberation among the selected citizens; and the collection and dissemination of data resulting from this process. For example, in the deliberative polling approach used by the Center for Deliberative Democracy, a random selection of citizens is first polled on a particular issue. Then, members of the poll are invited to gather at a single place to discuss the issue. Participants receive balanced briefing materials to review before the gathering, and at the gathering they engage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in small group discussions. After deliberations, the sample is asked the original poll questions, and the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions that the public would reach if everyone were given the opportunity to become more informed on pressing issues.6 If policymakers look at deliberative polls rather than traditional polls, they will be able to utilize results that originate from an informed group of citizens. As with traditional polls, deliberative polls choose people at random to represent U.S. demographics of age, education, gender, and so on. But traditional polls stop there, asking the random sample some brief, simple questions, typically online or over the phone. However, participants of deliberative polls have the opportunity to access expert information and then talk with one another before voting on policy recommendations. The power of this approach is illustrated by the results of a global deliberative process organized by World Wide Views on Global Warming ([www.wwviews.org](http://www.wwviews.org/)), a citizen’s deliberation organization based in Denmark.7 On September 26, 2009, approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider what should happen at the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (338 Americans met in five major cities). The results derived from this day of deliberation were dramatic and significantly different from results of traditional polls. Overall, citizens showed strong concern about global warming and support for climate-change legislation, contrary to the outcomes of many standard climate-change polls. Based on the polling results from these gatherings, 90 percent of global citizens believe that it is urgent for the UN negotiations to produce a new climate change agreement; 88 percent of global citizens (82 percent of U.S. citizens) favor holding global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels; and 74 percent of global citizens (69 percent of U.S. citizens) favor increasing fossil-fuel prices in developed countries. However, a typical news poll that was conducted two days before 350.org’s International Day of Climate Action on October 24, 2009, found that Americans had an overall declining concern about global warming.7 How can deliberative democracy help to create solutions for the climate-change policy process, to accelerate the kinds of policies and public investments that are so crucial to getting the world on a path to 350? Take again the example of wind in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC) launched an “integrated resource plan” to develop long-term strategies for energy production, particularly electricity.8 Upon learning about the deliberative polling approach of James Fishkin (then at the University of Texas at Austin), the PUC set up deliberative sessions for several hundred customers in the vicinity of every major utility provider in the state. The results were a surprise: it turned out that participants ranked reliability and stability of electricity supply as more important characteristics than price. In addition, they were open to supporting renewable energy, even if the costs slightly exceeded fossil-fuel sources. Observers considered this a breakthrough: based on these public deliberations, the PUC went on to champion an aggressive renewable portfolio standard, and the state has subsequently experienced little of the opposition to wind-tower siting that has slowed development in other states.8 By 2009, Texas had 9,500 megawatts of installed wind capacity, as much as the next six states (ranked by wind capacity) in the windy lower and upper Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Kansas, and New Mexico).9 Deliberative democracy has proven effective in a wide range of countries and settings. In the Chinese township of Zeguo, a series of deliberative polls has helped the Local People’s Congress (LPC) to become a more effective decision-making body.10 In February 2008, 175 citizens were randomly selected to scrutinize the town’s budget—and 60 deputies from the LPC observed the process. After the deliberations, support decreased for budgeting for national defense projects, while support rose for infrastructure (e.g., rural road construction) and environmental protection. Subsequently, the LPC increased support for environmental projects by 9 percent.10 In decades to come, China must be at the forefront of the world’s investments in clean-energy infrastructure. The experience of Zeguo, if scaled up and fully supported by Chinese leaders, can help to play an important role. Deliberative democracy offers one solution for determining citizen opinions, including those on pressing issues related to climate change and clean energy. If democracy is truly about representing popular opinion, policymakers should seek out deliberative polls in their decision-making process.

#### Energy POLICY matters and we need policy action to address the pressing energy needs of the U.S. and the world- Must evaluate consequences.

Timothy E. Wirth et. al, 2003, The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty,dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other thancoal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitutionof oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does notexist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the youngWinston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winningthe escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As DanielYergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increaseship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—andordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy tothis new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, andfarsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no lessconsequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and nationalsecurity. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. nationalinterests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization,the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, andthe need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwinedwith energy concerns.The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challengesof the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role inAmerica’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creativeapproaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainlyabout tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, andnuances of electricity regulation—di⁄cult issues all, but inadequate forthe larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to the issues it aªects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy,not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists.U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic securityposed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the globalenvironment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustionof fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modernenergy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics neededfor economic advancement is a deep concern.None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices.The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and,perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

### A2 Yancy

#### You should not ignore or reject our evidence because it doesn’t directly address institutionalized racism

Martyn Hammersley, 1993, Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR

This is not to say that practitioners, such as 'anti-racist' educators, should simply ignore the findings of research. The point is rather that they should judge those findings in relation to their own practical knowledge and according to what is required to pursue their work well. On this basis it might be quite reasonable for 'anti-racists to continue with their campaign against racism among teachers despite the doubts that Foster has raised; though they would be foolish to completely ignore those doubts. All this said, the criticisms of Foster's work do not seem to derive primarily from such practical judgments about his findings. Many of them seem more motivated by a concern with its possible propaganda consequences: not only can Foster's work not be used to support the 'anti-racist' campaign against teacher racism, it could be used by the other side. Indeed, it seems to be suspected by some of the critics that Foster is working for the opposition. The key question, for some at least, is 'whose side are we on?'.44 I do not doubt that propaganda considerations are necessary ones for practitioners engaged in political activity to take into account. While in an ideal world, perhaps, disputes would be resolved on the basis of discussion in pursuit of the truth, it is clear I think that the world we live in is very far from that ideal. However, great danger arises if propaganda concerns come to outweigh other practical concerns. In these circumstances, practical activity is likely to fail because erroneous assumptions accumulate; and its failure may do widespread damage. It would be a mistake, then, it seems to me, for 'anti-racists to dismiss Foster's work. To the extent that it throws doubt on the accuracy of some of the assumptions on which they operate, they ought to consider its validity seriously and not simply ignore, reject or even try to suppress it.45I t may point to a necessary reconstruction of 'anti-racism' This might be required if it were true that racism on the part of British teachers was not widespread or that it did not play a significant role in the generation of 'racial' inequality. Accepting this would not involve a denial that there may be features of the British education system and society that generate the under achievement of black pupils. Indeed, Foster himself suggests one mechanism for this: the allocation of black pupils to schools that are less effective educationally.46Of course, there still remains the question of what level or sort of evidence should persuade 'anti-racists' that Foster is right. I do not want to speculate about this here, merely to point out that there should be some level of confirming evidence at which 'anti-racists' would accept this argument. And even if Foster does not provide that level of evidence, his work could be accepted by them as making a potential contribution to increasing the effectiveness of their activities.47I n my view these considerations should outweigh any negative propaganda effects that Foster's work is likely to have. After all, racists have seldom found it difficult to invent arguments and evidence to support their position, and have generally shown scant regard for the difference between such inventions and more soundly based scientific conclusions. I want to conclude by going even further than this and suggesting that 'anti-racists' are unwise to reject the conventional model of research in favour of an activist conception. One reason for this is that the propaganda capacity of research is to a large extent parasitic upon the conventional model. Once research becomes seen as geared to the pursuit of particular political goals, with research results being selected, even in part, according to their suitability for propaganda purposes, its propaganda value is gone.

### nuke power good for minorities

#### Nuclear power offers better opportunities for minorities than status quo energies.

Mark Flanagan, 2012, Environmental Journalist, “Patrick Moore’s Economic Justice,” <http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2012/05/patrick-moores-economic-justice.html>

Patrick Moore, ex-Greenpeace, sees in nuclear energy an interesting argument for what he terms “environmental justice,” which is true enough, and economic justice, used in the headline, works as well: African-American and Hispanic advocacy groups have historically been focused on civil rights, but they're "morphing into economic development," Moore said, and looking at energy policy for the first time. Unlike many other big industrial facilities, he noted, polls show nuclear power plants have increasing popular support the closer people live to them. Nuclear plants are "wealth creating machines," Moore said, with no pollution, better roads and schools financed by the plants' property taxes, and large payrolls. Moore is right about this. Nuclear energy facilities are also often union shops, which offers a good path to the middle class and out of economic uncertainty. A city of industry can be a world of opportunity and nuclear energy plants have the added benefit of not turning communities into pollution laden sump holes. A cooling tower is not a smoke stack. Moore told AOL Energy that he is reaching out to African-American and Hispanic business and labor groups, telling them that nuclear plants, in contrast to projects like coal plants, are long-term community assets. I’m sure the coal industry might say a few words about that, but Moore has a point. [N]uclear not only needs thousands of skilled workers when plants are built new but generations of skilled workers to keep the units running for 60 or more years. Moore addresses other issues, too, including natural gas and small reactors – and his comments on these are interesting – but his comments on the economic value of nuclear plants seems particularly germane at this moment in time. Visit the Clean and Safe (CASE) Energy Coalition for more on his current activities.

## 1AR

### Management cards

#### Blaming imperialism for all oppression masks more violent forms of oppression – prefer our evidence, its comparative

Fred Halliday (Middle East Report) 1999 “The Middle East at the Millennial Turn” http://www.merip.org/mer/mer213/213\_hallliday.html

Recent developments in the Middle East and the onset of new global trends and uncertainties pose a challenge not only to those who live in the region but also to those who engage it from outside. Here, too, previously-established patterns of thought and commitment are now open to question. The context of the l960s, in which journals such as MERIP Reports (the precursor of this publication) and the Journal of the North American Committee on Latin America (NACLA) were founded, was one of solidarity with the struggles of Third World peoples and opposition to external, imperialist intervention. That agenda remains valid: Gross inequalities of wealth, power and access to rights–a.k.a. imperialism–persist. This agenda has been enhanced by political and ethical developments in subsequent decades. Those who struggle include not only the national groups (Palestinians and Kurds) oppressed by chauvinist regimes and the workers and peasants (remember them?) whose labor sustains these states, but now also includes analyses of gender oppression, press and academic suppression and the denial of ecological security. The agenda has also elaborated a more explicit stress on individual rights in tandem with the defense of collective rights. History itself and the changing intellectual context of the West have, however, challenged this emancipatory agenda in some key respects. On the one hand, oppression, denial of rights and military intervention are not the prerogative of external states alone: An anti-imperialism that cannot recognize–and denounce–indigenous forms of dictatorship and aggression, or that seeks, with varying degrees of exaggeration, to blame all oppression and injustice on imperialism, is deficient. The Iranian Revolution, Ba‘thist Iraq, confessional militias in Lebanon, armed guerrilla groups in a range of countries, not to mention the Taliban in Afghanistan, often represent a much greater immediate threat to human rights and the principles in whose name solidarity was originally formulated than does Western imperialism. Islamist movements from below meet repressive states from above in their conduct. What many people in the region want is not less external involvement but a greater commitment by the outside world, official and non-governmental, to protecting and realizing rights that are universally proclaimed but seldom respected. At the same time, in a congruence between relativist renunciation from the region and critiques of "foundationalist" and Enlightenment thinking in the West, doubt has been cast on the very ethical foundation of solidarity: a belief in universal human rights and the possibility of a solidarity based on such rights. Critical engagement with the region is now often caught between a denunciation of the West's failure actively to pursue the democratic and human rights principles it proclaims and a rejection of the validity of these principles as well as the possibility of any external encouragement of them. This brings the argument back to the critique of Western policy, and of the relation of that critique to the policy process itself. On human rights and democratization, official Washington and its European friends continue to speak in euphemism and evasion. But the issue here is not to see all US involvement as inherently negative, let alone to denounce all international standards of rights as imperialist or ethnocentric, but rather, to hold the US and its European allies accountable to the universal principles they proclaim elsewhere. An anti-imperialism of disengagement serves only to reinforce the hold of authoritarian regimes and oppressive social practices within the Middle East.